Abstract. The axiomatic route to the foundation of contest success functions (CSF) has proved to be both useful and proli…c. The standard approach in the literature is based on the decision-theoretic notion that choice probabilities should be independent of irrelevant alternatives (Skaperdas, Economic Theory 1996). The present paper develops an alternative approach that suggests itself once the contest is re-interpreted as a common-pool resource problem. Proceeding along these lines, new axiomatizations are obtained for a variety of popular classes of CSFs, including the logit, Tullock, and di¤erence-form CSFs. The axiomatizations provided are particularly parsimonious in the important special case of two contestants.
Introduction
In the theory of con ‡ict, the so-called contest success function (CSF) captures the technology by which a combination of e¤ort levels, one for each party to the con ‡ict, transforms into an assignment of winning probabilities. As it happened, much of the literature has chosen to work with speci…c functional forms rather than with general technologies. For instance, scholars have used the lottery contest of Tullock (1980) , the logit contest of Dixit (1987) , and the di¤erence-form contest of Hirshleifer (1989) . One way to justify such choices is it to characterize the functional form using a number of axioms.
1
The axiomatic foundation of CSFs was introduced to the literature through the seminal paper of Skaperdas (1996) , who proposed respective sets of axioms for the CSFs of the logit, Tullock, and di¤erence-form classes. 2 The requirement that is key to these axiomatizations may be summarized intuitively as follows. Suppose that it becomes known that some player i has not won the prize. Then, conditional on this information, the probability that some other player j has won, rather than any third player k, does not depend on the e¤ort level that was chosen by the unsuccessful player i. This requirement is structurally analogous to an axiom in the theory of probabilistic choice (Luce, 1959) , saying that choice probabilities should be independent of irrelevant alternatives. 3 The thereby outlined decision-theoretic approach has proved to be both useful and proli…c. In particular, the approach has been employed to derive axiomatizations of additional classes of CSFs, such as unfair contests (Clark and Riis, 1998) , contests with multi-dimensional investments (Rai and Sarin, 2009; Arbatskaya and Mialon, 2010) , group contests (Münster, 2009; Cubel and Sanchez-Pages, 2015) , contests on networks (Bozbay and Vesperoni, 2014) , and contests for multiple prizes (Vesperoni, 2014; Lu and Wang, 2015) . rent-seeking contests and common-pool resource problems which was noted especially in the experimental literature (e.g., Walker et al., 1990; Shupp et al., 2013) . For illustration, imagine a setting in the tradition of Gordon (1954) , where …shermen have unrestrcited access to a common …shing ground. Suppose that individual …rms choose their respective …shing e¤ort in a non-cooperative fashion, and subsequently sell their catch in separate local markets. Then any …sherman's decision to exert more e¤ort will negatively a¤ect the amount of …sh landed by the respective other …rms. 4 This type of setting has been modeled in various ways (e.g., Cornes and Sandler, 1983; Walker et al., 2000; Johnson and Libecap, 1982; Noussair et al., 2015) .
Cornes and Sandler, for example, assume that each …rm's share of industry output equals its share in private inputs, and that industry output is an increasing and concave function of aggregate input. The functional form of payo¤s is, therefore, identical to that of a lottery contest with productive group e¤ort, which is a well-known concept in contest theory. 5 Thus, certain models of common-pool resource problems may be directly interpreted as lotteries contests.
In the analysis below, we will take precisely the opposite direction, starting from an arbitrary contest, and keeping prizes constant. Consistent with the above literature, the common-pool resource problem will be modeled as a strategic game between a given number of …rms that operate as monopolists in independent markets, but that are exposed to negative externalities in production (see Figure 1 for illustration). Using suitable speci…cations of downstream demand and production functions, we will establish a formal isomorphism between the contest on the one hand and an associated common-pool resource problem on the other. Re-interpreting the contest in 4 Gardner et al. (1990, p. 343) provide the following description of such technological externalities: "For …shing trawlers to operate e¢ ciently, they need to travel over a large domain. Fixed nets operating in the same territory increase the operating costs for both trawlers and …xed net users. Similarly, if one group of …shers uses dynamite in their …shing e¤orts, the costs for other …shers rise as a result of this production technology." 5 See, e.g., Chung (1996) .
this way, properties of CSFs translate into properties of technologies, which may therefore be used to derive production-theoretic characterizations of speci…c classes of CSF. Following this line of reasoning, new axiomatizations will be obtained for a variety of popular classes of CSFs, including the logit, Tullock, and di¤erence-form contests.
6
The literature has developed numerous alternative interpretations of the rent-seeking game (see Jia et al., 2013) . Restricting attention to the …eld of industrial economics, there are static and dynamic interpretations. Static interpretations relate to Cournot competition (Szidarovszky and Okuguchi, 1997) , and oligopsonistic markets for in ‡uence (Menezes and Quiggin, 2010) .
Dynamic interpretations have been o¤ered in terms of R&D races (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992; Jia 2008) , and innovation tournaments and patent races (Baye and Hoppe, 2003) . The characterization provided below, however, di¤ers from all those contributions by stressing a true monopoly role for all the contestants.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the set-up. Logit contests are characterized in Section 3. Section 4 o¤ers some discussion. Tullock contest are considered in Section 4. Section 5 deals with contests of the di¤erence form. Section 6 concludes. Complementary materials and proofs have been relegated to an Appendix. 6 An alternative way to look at the present paper is it to stress the distinction between a variable and a …xed number of contestants. For example, in the axiomatic theory of bargaining, it was initially assumed that the number of agents is …xed, and the extension to a variable number of agents was achieved only subsequently (Thomson, 1985) . In the axiomatic foundation of CSF, however, the bulk of the literature has traditionally assumed a variable number of contestants. Only a limited number of papers, including the present one, have worked under the assumption of a …xed number of contestants. I am grateful for Luis Corchón for suggesting the analogy to the literature on axiomatic bargaining.
Contestants as monopolists exploiting a common-pool resource
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be the set of players, where n 2. The number of players n will be kept …xed in the sequel.
In an n-player rent-seeking contest, each player i 2 N chooses a level of effort X i 0, with the intention to increase her chances of appropriating a rent which she values with V i > 0. A CSF p = fp i g i2N will be understood to be a …nite collection of real-valued mappings p i on R n + . 7 Structural assumptions on the CSF will be imposed below. We will make use of the usual notational conventions of game theory. In particular, for any given vector of e¤ort levels (X 1 ; :::; X n ) 2 R n + , we will alternatively write (X i ; X i ) (X 1 ; :::; X n ),
where X i = (X 1 ; :::; X i 1 ; X i+1 ; :::; X n ). Contestant i's expected payo¤ is then given as
as usual.
In an n-player common-pool resource problem, each …rm i = 1; :::; n operates as a monopolist in a separate downstream market, where inverse demand in market i is given by a downward-sloping function P i = P i (Q i ), and Q i denotes …rm i's level of output in the considered period. For example, …sh is sold at di¤erent shores of the same lake. Interaction among …rms is assumed to be either one-shot or time-independent repeated. 8 Firm i's stationary 7 As usual, R + and R ++ denote the respective sets of nonnegative and positive real numbers, and R n + and R n ++ the corresponding n-fold Cartesian products. 8 This is an adequate representation of a common-pool resource problem when the natural replacement rate of the resource is at least as great as current and foreseeable withdrawal rates, so that the common pool is able to maintain itself. Cf. Gardner et al. (1990, p. 346) . Also, the literature has remained skeptical about the Folk theorem as a practical policy solution for common-pool resource problems, e.g., because of coordination problems (Ostrom et al., 1994, p. 18) . With these considerations in mind, the time-level of output (or …sh landed) Q i is then assumed to be determined by a deterministic production function Q i = f i (X i ; X i ), where X i 0 is the stationary amount of input (or …shing e¤ort). The fact that Q i depends not only on X i , as it would in a stand-alone monopoly setting, but also on X i , re ‡ects the technological externalities that cause the resource con ‡ict. Given input choices X i for …rm i and a vector of input choices X i for the other (n 1) monopolists, …rm i's per-period pro…t is assumed to be given by
where C i is the cost function, and the right-hand-side is interpreted as
Note that costs are considered here as a function of …shing e¤ort, rather than of the weight of landed …sh. Letting …rms choose inputs is consistent with much of the existing work in the area (e.g., Johnson and Libecap, 1982; Cornes and Sandler, 1983; Walker et al., 1990; Casari and Plott, 2003; Noussair et al., 2015) . In fact, allowing …rms to choose inputs rather than outputs might be somewhat more natural in a set-up with negative externalities in production. Notwithstanding, in reduced-form models of common-pool resource problems (e.g., Walker et al., 2000) , it is assumed that …rms choose outputs. As we show in Appendix A, those models may likewise be seen as special cases of the speci…cation (2), once payo¤s are expressed in terms of inputs.
The starting point of our analysis is now the following intuitive result.
Observation 1. For any given n-player rent-seeking contest, there exist independent repeated game will be considered here as a stationary repetition of the oneshot game.
speci…cations of inverse demand functions fP i (Q i )g i2N , production functions ff i (X i ; X i )g i2N , and cost functions fC i (X i )g i2N such that the contest and the resulting common-pool resource problem are strategically equivalent, i.e., such that b i (X i ; X i ) = i (X i ; X i ) for any i = 1 ; :::; n, and for any vector
Proof. To a given rent-seeking contest, we associate the common-pool resource problem de…ned through the primitives
Fix some …rm i 2 N , and a vector of e¤orts
is …nite, and its revenue may be written as
Moreover, in limit cases where p i (X i ; X i ) = 1, …rm i's revenue satis…es
Thus, either way,
This proves the claim.
Logit contests
The re-interpretation of the rent-seeking model achieved in the previous section serves as a basis for deriving alternative axiomatic characterizations of several popular classes of CSFs. In this section, we start with CSFs of the logit class. We will say that p = fp i g i2N is of the logit form if there is a di¤er-entiable and monotone increasing function g :
for any X i > 0, and such that
for all i = 1; :::; n, and for all (
The function g will be referred to as the impact function.
The common-pool production function (4) associated with the logit CSF is easily calculated to be
Thus, contestant i's output is a separable function of X i and X i . In other words, while the respective activity levels of …rm i's opponents may impair …rm i's absolute level of output, relative changes to output caused by changes 9 In particular, no restriction on the value of
to own input do not depend on other …rms'levels of input. Thus, the logit assumption has structural implications for …rm i's scale elasticity, which is de…ned as usual (e.g., Ewerhart, 2003) as the elasticity of output with respect to own input,
Indeed, the vector X i has the nature of a public bad, and therefore does not change when …rm i expands its operations. 10 For expositional reasons, we will assume throughout that i is well-de…ned and …nite on R n ++ . This assumption could be easily relaxed. For instance, under the basic axioms (A0) and (A1) introduced below, it would su¢ ce to assume that p i is di¤erentiable on R n ++ .
The discussion above leads to the following result.
Lemma 1. Suppose that p is of the logit form. Then, in the associated common-pool resource problem, any …rm i's scale elasticity i (X i ; X i ) at any given input level X i does not depend on the vector of input levels X i of the respective other …rms.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The simple property of the CSF captured by Lemma 1 may be used as a substitute for Luce's axiom to obtain a modi…ed characterization of the CSF of the logit type. To see this, consider the following axioms that may be imposed on an arbitrary CSF p = fp i g i2N , with n 2 …xed.
Axiom A0 (Probability) P i2N p i (X 1 ; :::; X n ) = 1 for any (X 1 ; :::; X n ) 2 R n + ; moreover, p i (X 1 ; :::; X n ) 0 for all i 2 N and any (X 1 ; :::; X n ) 2 R n + .
Axiom A1 (Monotonicity) p i is weakly increasing in
Axiom A3 (Anonymity) For any permutation of N , and for any (X 1 ; :::; X n ) 2 R n + , we have
for all i 2 N . The following is the main result of the present paper. Proof. See the Appendix.
Discussion
Theorem 1 allows replacing the two axioms employed by Skaperdas (1996) to capture Luce's requirement, i.e., consistency and independence, by the simple requirement that any …rm's scale elasticity should be independent of the activity levels chosen by other …rms. Thus, the axiomatization provided in the previous section o¤ers a complementary view on the popular logit assumption.
While Theorem 1 delivers a particularly parsimonious axiomatization for the case n = 2, it holds also for more than two …rms. This may be surprising because axiom (A4) imposes very little structure on the way in which the externalities caused by n 1 competitors a¤ect the production of any given …rm. For example, individual externalities might be substitutes or complements to each other. Intuitively, the crucial element behind the extension to more than two players is axiom (A3). Indeed, anonymity is exploited in the proof using a new type of induction argument, counting down the number of …rms that employ an identical level of activity.
too little bite to shape the functional form of the CSF. Only when a third contestant is added, and the axioms are imposed also on the larger contest, the axiomatization is e¤ective. 13 The problem may be resolved by considering CSF with a positive probability of a draw. Our solution, however, does not change the class of CSF. Indeed, as shown below, the axiomatization captured by Theorem 1 is immune to Blavatskyy's counterexample.
Example 1. Let
As shown in the Appendix, in this case
In particular, 1 (1; 1) = 3 4 6 = 5 6 = 1 (1; 2), and therefore, axiom (A4) does not hold.
The Tullock contest
For a parameter R 0, consider the Tullock CSF p R = fp
where the ratio is to be read as 1=n when the denominator vanishes.
14 Obviously, p R is of the logit form, where the impact function is given by 13 For an illustration of this point, see Appendix B. 14 The properties of the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the Tullock contest are fairly well-understood. See, e.g., Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992), Baye et al. (1994) , and Ewerhart (2014) . g(X i ) = X R i for R > 0, and by g(X i ) = 1 for R = 0. In particular, as shown above in (12)- (15), the monopoly output associated with the Tullock CSF is given by
and the corresponding scale elasticity reads (cf. the proof of Lemma 1)
The formal discussion may be summarized as follows.
Lemma 2. In the common-pool resource problem associated with the Tullock contest, any given …rm's scale elasticity is independent both of its own e¤ort level and of the e¤ort levels chosen by the other …rms.
Proof. See text above.
A weak form of this property su¢ ces to pin down the corresponding CSF.
Axiom A4' For any i 2 N , there exists a constant R i 0 such that
Replacing (A4) by the more stringent (A4'), we arrive at the following characterization.
Theorem 2. (A0)-(A3) and (A4') are satis…ed if and only if p = p R for some R 0.
Kooreman and Schoonbeek (1997) characterize the two-player Tullock CSF.
They require that the own-bid elasticity of player 1's winning probability is proportional to player 1's probability of losing, i.e., that
for some constant R 1 > 0. One can show that condition (26) is mathematically equivalent to the corresponding condition imposed by (A4') on 1 . 15 In this sense, therefore, Theorem 2 might be seen as an extension of Kooreman and Schoonbeek's result to n-player Tullock contests.
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Multiplying through with (1 p 1 (X 1 ; X 2 )) yields one direction of the claim. The converse follows by reverting the steps of the argument. 16 Bell et al. (1975) o¤er a characterization of the lottery CSF. Their axiom set is different, however. For example, they take the variability assumption to its limit in the sense that the axioms for any number of contestants are needed for characterizing even the two-player lottery contest, just as integer denominators of arbitrary size are needed to approximate any given real number by a ratio of integers.
CSFs of the di¤erence form
Hirshleifer (1989) suggested that success probabilities in a two-player contest should depend on the di¤erence of e¤orts. Speci…cally, for some constant 0, player i's probability of winning may be given by the convenient functional form
for i = 1; 2, and any (X 1 ; X 2 ) 2 R 2 + . In straightforward extension (cf. Skaperdas, 1996) , an n-player CSF p = fp i g i2N will be referred to as being of the di¤erence form if there is a 0 such that
for any i = 1; :::; n and any (X 1 ; :::; X n ) 2 R n + . It is immediate to see that (32) may be transformed into a logit form, provided that the impact function is chosen as g(X i ) = exp( X i ).
The following example extends Blavatskyy's arguments to contests of the di¤erence form.
Example 2. For n = 2, consider the CSF p = fp i g i2N given by
In the Appendix, it is shown that this CSF satis…es the relevant axioms of Skaperdas (1996) for n = 2, even though it is not of the di¤erence form as de…ned above.
We o¤er a modi…ed axiomatization also for CSFs of the di¤erence form.
To this end, we will add Skaperdas' (1996) invariance requirement to our axiom system for the logit form.
(A5) (Translation invariance) p i (X 1 ; :::; X n ) = p i (X 1 + c; :::; X n + c) for any i 2 f1; :::; ng, any (X 1 ; :::; X n ) 2 R n + , and any c > 0.
The modi…ed axiomatization reads now as follows. Proof. See the Appendix.
Conclusion
In this paper, a formal equivalence has been established between rent-seeking games and common-pool resource problems. While potentially interesting in itself, the equivalence was used to relate properties of CSF to concepts of production theory. As a result, new axiomatizations have been derived for a number of popular CSF.
The axiomatizations provided in this paper are particularly parsimonious when there are only two contestants. This aspect of the common-pool approach should be welcomed because numerous applications of contest theory work with two-person contests as a main building block. 17 Relatedly, as we discussed, the common-pool approach to the axiomatic foundation of CSF resolves an important issue recently identi…ed by Blavatskyy (2010) . However, based upon a novel induction argument, the common-pool perspective delivers concise axiom sets also for contests with more than two players.
The common-pool perspective may be readily implemented for any subclass of the logit CSF de…ned through an additional axiom (or through a set of additional axioms). We have illustrated this fact in the case of the di¤erence-form contest. Other straightforward examples include, in particular, the class of CSF de…ned by Chakravarty and Maharaj (2014) through an invariance axiom that convexi…es homogeneity and translation invariance, and the class of two-player CSF characterized by Hwang (2012) through the requirement of a constant "elasticity of augmentation."
The formal equivalence between rent-seeking games and common-pool resource problems has some unexpected implications. For example, one of the main insights in the literature on common-pool resource problems is that small-scale solutions may help to mitigate the tendency to overexploit the resource (e.g., Ostrom, 2000) . Observation 1 shows that the literature on the alliance-formation puzzle in contest theory (Esteban and Sákovics, 2003; Konrad and Kovenock, 2009 ) deals with a structurally quite similar problem.
Appendix A: Common-pool resource problems
It will be shown that reduced-form models of common-pool resource problems may be subsumed under the more general form used in the body of the paper.
A number of papers (e.g., Walker et al., 2000; Margreiter et al., 2005; Freeman and Anderson, 2013) employ the reduced-form payo¤ function
where , , , and are positive constants such that > . Suppose that …rms choose inputs X i rather than outputs Q i . Then, one may specify
Summing (38) over all players leads to
Plugging this back into (38), we arrive at
Using (36) and (37), it follows that
Thus, the payo¤s in the common-pool resource problem (35) are indeed a special case of (2).
Appendix B: Using the decision-theoretic approach to characterize a contest with a …xed number of players Attention will be restricted to the case n = 2. To characterize a CSF p = fp i g i=1;2 , of the logit form, given by functions p 1 (X 1 ; X 2 ) and p 2 (X 1 ; X 2 ), the usual proof invoking Luce's axiom would tend to assume the existence of a CSF e p = fe p i g i=1;2;3 , given by functions e p 1 (X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 ), e p 2 (X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 ), and e p 3 (X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 ). Moreover, it would be assumed that (i) the relationship
holds, that (ii) the ratio
is independent of X 2 , and …nally, that (iii) the ratio
is independent of X 1 . Under these conditions, letting X 3 = a > 0 would imply that
, (47) which shows that p is indeed of the logit class (Skaperdas, 1996) . Even though conditions (i)-(iii) make much sense in a setting with a variable number of contestants, it may also be natural to search for a more parsimonious characterization when the number of contestants is …xed.
Appendix C: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Firm i's scale elasticity at the activity level X i is given
For the logit case, however, it was shown in the body of the paper that
Hence, plugging (49) into (48), one immediately obtains
which obviously does not depend on X i . This proves the lemma.
The following auxiliary result is used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma C.1 For a …xed n 2, let g > 0 and ' > 0 be functions on R ++ and R n 1 ++ , respectively, such that
for any (X 1 ; :::
Proof. It clearly su¢ ces to show that
holds for all vectors X 1 = (X 2 ; :::; X n ) 2 R n 1 ++ . Take an arbitrary vector
++ . Then, there is a maximum index k 2 f1; :::; n 1g such that
i.e., the …rst k components of the vector X 1 are all equal. The proof of (52) will be achieved by downwards induction on k. To establish the basis for the induction argument, assume that k = n 1. In that case, all components of X 1 are equal, i.e.,
Then, choosing X 1 X 2 , equation (51) reads
where we use the notation
Using (55), one …nds that
thereby establishing (52) for k = n 1. Next, we will prove the induction step. To this end, assume that (52) has been shown for all vectors with an initial sequence of k equal components, where k 2 f2; :::; n 1g. Take now an arbitrary vector X 1 = (X 2 ; :::; X n ) 2 R n 1 ++ such that
i.e., with an initial sequence of merely k 1 equal components. Then, letting again X 1 X 2 , equation (51) reads
; X k+1 ; :::; X n ) (59)
1 ; X k+1 ; :::; X i 1 ; X i+1 ; :::; X n )
, where we use the notation
Since the vector (X
1 ; X k+1 ; :::; X i 1 ; X i+1 ; :::; X n ) has an initial sequence of k equal components, the induction hypothesis implies that
1 ; X k+1 ; :::; X i 1 ; X i+1 ; :::; X n ) (61)
Plugging this into (59), we obtain
; X k+1 ; :::; X n ) (62)
; X k+1 ; :::
. (63) Solving now for '(X (k 1) 1
; X k+1 ; :::; X n ) yields
; X k+1 ; :::; X n )
Hence, relationship (52) holds also for all vectors with an initial sequence of k 1 equal components. By downwards induction, starting at k = n 1, and ending at k = 2, we have therefore shown that (52) 
is well-de…ned and …nite for any (X i ; X i ) 2 R n ++ , and does not depend on X i . The fundamental theorem of analysis implies now that 
Equation (71) continues to hold for X 0 i > 1, provided the integral is interpreted in the usual way, i.e., via the relationship Z 1
Thus, there are functions i > 0 and g i > 0 such that
for any (X i ; X i ) 2 R n ++ . Moreover, by anonymity, neither i nor g i depend on i. Hence, we may drop the index, and obtain
for any (X i ; X i ) 2 R n ++ , and any i = 1; :::; n. Invoking now Lemma C.1, for
, it follows that
Hence,
Moreover, from (A1), i 0, so that g is monotone increasing. This proves the theorem.
The following claim has been made in Example 1.
we have
Proof. The common-pool resource production function associated with p 1 is given by
Using (67-68), it follows that
This proves the lemma. hold. Since (A4') is more stringent than (A4), Theorem 1 implies that p is of the logit class. Thus, there exists a di¤erentiable and monotone increasing function g on R + such that g(X i ) > 0 for any X i > 0, and such that
for all i = 1; :::; n, and for all (X i ; X i ) 2 R n + nf0g. By (A4'), there is a …nite
Since, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1,
we …nd that
This di¤erential equation has the general solution g(X i ) = i X R i i , where i 2 R. Recall that g(X i ) > 0 for any X i > 0. Hence, i > 0 for all i = 1; :::; n. Moreover, since the impact function g is homogeneous across
contestants, it follows that 1 = ::: = n and R 1 = ::: = R n R. Thus,
This proves the theorem.
The following claim has been made in Example 2.
Lemma C.3. The CSF p = fp i g i=1;2 given by
satis…es the conditions of Skaperdas (1996, Theorem 3) for n = 2, even though it is not of the di¤erence form as de…ned in Section 6.
Proof. We …rst check the various conditions of the theorem.
Ska96-A1 By straightforward calculation,
Moreover, p 1 (X 1 ; X 2 ) 0; p 2 (X 1 ; X 2 ) 0, for any X 1 0; X 2 0;
Ska96-A2 Since the mapping x 7 ! x 3 is strictly increasing, p 1 (X 1 ; X 2 ) is strictly increasing in X 1 , for any X 2 0, and strictly decreasing in X 2 , for any X 1 0. Similarly, p 2 (X 1 ; X 2 ) is strictly increasing in X 2 , for any X 1 0, and strictly decreasing in X 1 , for any X 2 0.
Ska96-A3 Note that
An analogous argument shows that p 1 (X 2 ; X 1 ) = p 2 (X 1 ; X 2 ).
Ska96-A4 For n = 2 contestants, this property requires only that
which is trivially satis…ed because p 1 (X 1 ; X 2 ) + p 2 (X 2 ; X 1 ) = 1, as shown above.
Ska96-A5
There are only n = 2 contestants. Therefore, there are no other players whose e¤ort levels p 1 (X 1 ; X 2 ) or p 2 (X 1 ; X 2 ) could possibly be a function of. Thus, this property holds trivially.
Ska96-A7 For any c 2 R such that X i + c 0 for i = 1; 2, we have
= p 1 (X 1 ; X 2 ),
and, similarly, p 2 (X 1 + c; X 2 + c) = p 2 (X 1 ; X 2 ):
Thus, all conditions of Skaperdas (1996, Theorem 3) for n = 2 are satis…ed. Next, it is shown that p is not of the di¤erence form. To provoke a contradiction, suppose that there is a > 0 such that 1 1 + exp( (X 2 X 1 )) = 1 1 + exp(2(X 2 X 1 ) 3 )
for any (X 1 ; X 2 ) 2 R 2 + . Then exp( (X 2 X 1 )) = exp(2(X 2 X 1 ) 3 ).
Taking the log on both side, and writing z = X 2 X 1 , we obtain 
Since the real parameter z may assume more than three di¤erent values, this cannot hold for any …xed , and we arrive at the desired contradiction.
The importance of the following type of result for the characterization of CSF has been noted by Skaperdas (1996) .
Lemma C.4 If 0 is a continuous function that satis…es (Z 1 + Z 2 ) = (Z 1 ) + (Z 2 ) for all Z 1 > 0 and all Z 2 > 0, then there is a 0 such that (Z) = Z for any Z > 0.
Proof. See Aczél (1966, p. 34) .
The subsequent proof is adapted from Skaperdas (1996) .
Proof of Theorem 3. (Necessity) As discussed in Section 6, any CSF of the di¤erence form belongs, in particular, to the logit class. Therefore, 
= p i (X 1 + c; :::; X n + c),
for any i 2 f1; :::; ng, which proves the claim. (Su¢ ciency) Suppose that (A0)-(A5) hold. Then, by Theorem 1, there exists a di¤erentiable and monotone increasing function g on R + such that g(X i ) > 0 for any X i > 0, and such that p i (X 1 ; :::; X n ) = g(X i ) g(X 1 ) + ::: + g(X n ) ,
for all i = 1; :::; n, and for all (X 1 ; :::; X n ) 2 R n + nf0g. From (A5), it follows that g(X i ) g(X 1 ) + ::: + g(X n ) = g(X i + c) g(X 1 + c) + ::: + g(X n + c) ,
for any c > 0, any i = 1; :::; n, and any (X 1 ; :::; X n ) 2 R n + nf0g. Since n 2, there exists some player j 6 = i such that, likewise g(X j ) g(X 1 ) + ::: + g(X n ) = g(X j + c) g(X 1 + c) + ::: + g(X n + c) .
Combining (108) and (109) yields
provided that X i > 0. In particular, for X j = 0,
which implies g(0) > 0 (by evaluating at c > 0). Moreover, applying the log to both sides of equation (111), and re-arranging, we obtain
for any c > 0 and any X i > 0. Using the notation (Z) = ln( g(Z) g (0) ),
we have that, for any Z 1 > 0 and any Z 2 > 0,
Since g is di¤erentiable, is continuous on R ++ . Hence, by Lemma C.4 above, (Z) = Z for some 0. Thus, g(Z) = g(0) exp( Z) for any Z > 0, and therefore, for any (X 1 ; :::; X n ) 2 R n + nf0g, p i (X 1 ; :::; X n ) = g(0) exp( X i ) g(0) exp( X 1 ) + ::: + g(0) exp( X n )
= exp( X i ) exp( X 1 ) + ::: + exp( X n ) .
Finally, one notes that from (A3), p i (0; :::; 0) = 1 n = exp( 0) exp( 0) + ::: + exp( 0) .
It follows that p = fp i g i2N is indeed of the di¤erence form.
